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The question of when a planter or farm manager is totally
and permanently disabled within the meaning of an insurance
policy was presented to the court in Pearson v. Prudential Insurance Company of America." It was found that the insured had
had an attack of coronary thrombosis which had left him in
such a condition that it was not safe for him to carry on his former physically strenuous activities. It also appeared, however, that
insured was the owner of about 850 acres of land for the operation
of which he employed managers, assisted by his wife and brother.
The court followed the Boughton case 9 in holding that if the disability is such that the insured is rendered unable to perform
the substantial and material acts of his business or occupation
in the usual and customary way, it is total and permanent.
In Stovall v. Empire States Insurance Company1 ° the court
found no reason for holding a fire policy void on the ground that
the insured had withheld material facts where all the facts were
either known to the agent or subject to discovery on inquiry prior
to the loss. It also held that the plaintiff had not lost his insurable
interest in the property by forming a corporation to which he
had never transferred it.
VI. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Dale E. Bennett*

A.

CRIMINAL LAW

Definition of Crimes-Certainty Required
General language, as distinguished from detailed specification and enumeration, may be used in defining crimes-provided
the words employed are of definite well-understood application.
For example, "reasonable care" to avoid injuring others traveling
upon the streets was held by the Maryland court to constitute a
"flexible but reasonably certain" standard of conduct.' In the
8. 214 La. 220, 36 So.(2d) 763 (1948).

9. Boughton v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 183 La. 908, 165 So. 140
(1936).
10. 215 La. 100, 39 So.(2d) 837 (1949).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. State v. Magaha, 182 Md. 122, 129-130, 32 Atl. (2d) 477, 480-481 (1943). In
this case Judge Delaplaine epitomized the policy underlining his and many
other similar decisions when he declared "It is desirable, of course, that penal

statutes and ordinances should be expressed in language as specific as the
subject matter will permit, but it is obviously impossible to define some types
of crime by a detailed description of all possible cases that may arise. The
prohibited act may be characterized by a general term without definition, if
the term has a settled common-law meaning and a commonly understood
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recent case of State v. Evans2 the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that a statute making it a misdemeanor to prospect for oil, gas
and other minerals by means of mechanical devices on private
lands without the consent of the owner 3 had sufficiently defined
the offense in words having a well-defined and commonly accepted meaning. "The ordinary man," declared Justice Ponder,
"has no difficulty in understanding what prospecting for oil with
mechanical devices means, especially when these phrases are
used inconnection with the oil industry. It is not necessary to
state any and every mechanical device which might be used in
the discovery of minerals in the statute.... "1
in connection with the oil industry. It is not necessary to state
any and every mechanical device which might be used in the
discovery of minerals in the statute....
Applying the same common sense formula, the Louisiana
Supreme Court had previously upheld the constitutionality 5 of the
broad but well-understood language employed by the Louisiana
Criminal Code in defining such important crimes as Theft 6 and
Gambling. 7 Similarly, the court had upheld the definition of
Indecent Behaviour with Juveniles, in Article 81 of the Criminal
Code, as the commission of "lewd or lascivious act upon the person or in the presence of any child, under the age of seventeen,
with the intention of arousing or gratifying the sexual desires of
either person." The terms "lewd or lascivious" were found to
have a sufficiently well-understood meaning, and the definition
meaning which does not leave a person of ordinary intelligence in doubt as to
its purport, even though there may be in the term an element of degree as to
which estimates of reasonable men might differ."
2. 214 La. 472, 38 So. (2d) 140 (1948).
3. La. Act 212 of 1934.
4. 214 La. 472, 479, 38 So. (2d) 140, 143.
5. La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, § 10, provides that: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be Informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him." The Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution (Due
Process Clause) has also been Interpreted so as to require reasonable certainty
in the definition of crimes.
6. Article 67 defined Theft so as to eliminate many of the obtuse distinctions and troublesome enumerations which had characterized Louisiana's
numerous prior statutory laws on the subject. This article was held constitutional in State v. Pete, 206 La. 1078, 20 So. (2d) 368 (1944).
7. Gambling had previously been denounced in a series of cumbersomely
worded statutes, dealing separately with the various forms of gambling.
Article 90 of the Criminal Code simply defined gambling as "the conducting,
as a business, of any game, contest, lottery, or contrivance whereby a person
risks the loss of anything of value in order to realize a profit." This article
was upheld in State v. Varnado, 208 La. 319, 23 So. (2d) 106 (1944). Justice
Fournet definitely recognized the impossibility of specifying every variation
of the conduct prescribed as criminal and sanctioned the use of broad language, provided the line between criminal and non-riminal conduct is sufficiently
drawn to be clearly ascertainable.
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was further characterized by the requirement of a specific inten8
tion to arouse or gratify sexual desires.
The phrase "immoral purpose," however, was held to be
susceptible of so many variations of meaning and interpretation
that it rendered the definitions of Keeping a Disorderly House 9
and of Contributing to the Delinquency of a Juvenile 0 too vague
and indefinite. To one person or judge, it might denote only sexual immorality. To another it might embrace such things as
playing baseball on Sunday, or unfair trade practices. Thus, the
phrase "immoral purposes" failed to apprise sufficiently those
subject to the articles involved as to what conduct would be considered criminal, or to establish a reasonably definite standard
for the adjudicative process.
In 1948, Article 104 was amended to re-define Keeping a Disorderly House as the keeping of a place "to be used habitually for
any illegal or sexually immoral purposes."" Similarly, Clause (7)
of Article 92 was changed to define Contributing to the Delinquency of a Juvenile so as to require the enticing, aiding, or permitting of "any sexually immoral act."'1 2 As thus amended, these
articles of the Criminal Code should now provide a sufficient
definition of the prescribed criminal conduct. The supreme court's
recent decision in State v. Stewart 8 affords no indication as to the
judicial fate of these amended articles. In that case, defendants
had been found guilty of aiding a sixteen year old girl to perform
acts of sexual intercourse. This would clearly be a "sexually immoral act." In reversing the conviction and sentence, however,
the supreme court pointed out that the prosecution and trial had
been based upon the original form of Article 92 (7), which had
been held unconstitutional.14
Probably the most difficult case yet presented, and one coming close to the line between sufficient definition and unconstitutional vagueness, involved the constitutionality of Clause (2) of
Article 106 of the Criminal Code which defined Obscenity to include the possession with intent to display of "any indecent print,
8. State v. Saibold, 213 La. 415, 34 So. (2d) 909 (1948); State v. LeBlanc,
213 La. 404, 34 So. (2d) 905 (1948).
9. State v. Truby, 211 La. 178, 29 So. (2d) 758 (1947), declaring Art. 104, La.
Crim. Code of 1942 partially unconstitutional.
10. State v. Vallery, 212 La. 1095, 34 So. (2d) 329 (1948), declaring clause
(7) of Art. 92, La. Crim. Code of 1942 unconstitutional.
11. La. Act 389 of 1948.
12. La. Act 388 of 1948.
13. 214 La. 365, 37 So. (2d) 820 (1948).
14. Citing and following State v. Vallery, 212 La. 1095, 34 So.(2d) 329
(1948).
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picture, written composition, model or instrument." In State
v. Kraft 15 the defendant was prosecuted "for having in his possession with intent to display, an indecent print and movie film." It
was claimed that the word "indecent," like the word "immoral,"
was so vague that it failed to apprise sufficiently the defendant of
the line between criminal and non-criminal conduct. The supreme court might have treated the phrase "indecent print" as
similar to the words "lewd dancing" which had been held sufficiently definite in a pre-Criminal Code decision. 1 6 Also, the
United States Supreme Court had recently stated that the words
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent, and disgusting were of
permissible certainty and well-understood by long use in the
criminal law. 17 In the Kraft case, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court chose to construe the phrase "indecent print" as
similar in nature to the broad phase "immoral act" which ,it
had previously held insufficient for a criminal law definition.
Possibly if the definition in Article 106 had included additional
characterizing language such as that recently approved by the
United States Supreme Court, it would have been upheld by the
Louisiana court.
It is suggested that the offender in the Kraft case, and in
other cases which might have come within the purview of Article
106 (2), had a reasonably clear understanding of what the legislature contemplated when it prohibited the possession with intent to display "an indecent print." Additional language could
not add a great deal to that definition which, by the very nature
of things, contemplates a type of conduct which may assume a
multitude of different forms. 18 The offender who seeks to skate
15. 214 La. 351, 37 So. (2d) 815 (1948), noted in (1949) 9 LOUISIANA LAW
REviEw 414.

16. State v. Rose, 147 La. 243, 84 So. 643 (1920) holding that a 1912 act
defining a Disorderly House as one where "lewd dancing" was permitted
sufficiently met the test of certainty.
17. See Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed. 840,
(1948).
Accord: 33 Am. Jur. 20, §9. "While the statutes relating to obscenity do
not generally undertake to define obscene or indecent pictures or publications, nevertheless the words usually employed in the statutes are themselves
descriptive being words of common use and readily understood by persons of
ordinary intelligence."
18. While not exactly in point, the court's statement in City of Shreveport
v. Fanny Roos, 35 La. Ann. 1010 (1883), indicates an early appreciation of the
frequent impossibility of complete specification and enumeration in defining
morality crimes. A Shreveport ordinance provided that a fine should be imposed upon anyone who conducted a house of ill fame "in an indecent manner." In upholding the constitutionality of this ordinance against defense
counsel's claims of vagueness and uncertainty, Justice Manning declared, "It
could scarcely be expected that an ordinance affecting houses of this kind
should specify the particular act of indecency which will render its inmates
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on the outer edges of law and propriety can hardly express surprise that the exhibition in question is held to be indecent. In a
borderline case, the general maxim that criminal statutes are
strictly construed in favor of the accused should protect from
surprise or oppression.
Attempted Aggravated Criminal Damage to Property by
Lying in Wait with a Dangerous Weapon
Mere preparation to commit a crime is not sufficient to constitute an attempt. The general jurisprudence indicated that
lying in wait or searching for the intended victim was a mere act
of preparation, not coming close enough to the crime itself to
constitute a criminal attempt. However, there were substantial
practical reasons for extending the attempt concept so as to include the offender who arms himself with a dangerous weapon
and waits or searches for the victim. The danger of the activity
and the unequivocal nature of the action already taken fully justified this result. With these considerations in mind, it was specifically provided in Paragraph 2 of the general Attempt article
of the Criminal Code' 9 that "lying in wait with a dangerous weapon with the intent to commit a crime or searching for the intended victim with a dangerous weapon with the intent to commit a
crime shall be sufficient to constitute an attempt to commit the
offense intended."
The case of State v. Murff2 ° presented a unique and difficult
problem as to the applicability and scope of the above quoted
provision. Justice Hawthorne's opinion in that case should do
much to establish a practical and workable interpretation of the
rule. The defendants appealed from a conviction of Attempted
Aggravated Criminal Damage to Property, alleging that the facts
of the case did not show a lying in wait "with a dangerous weapon." Pursuant to a plan to damage a bus operated by the Southern Bus Lines, Incorporated, their former employer, the defendants had procured a number of mowing machine blades, specially
obnoxious to the law's denunciation. These acts may be so various in kind
and so differing in degree, and withal so numerous, as to defy specification.
The experience of the city fathers in that domain is doubtless so limited that
in drafting an ordinance which should comprehend all the indecent convolutions of lascivious cyprians they would be forced to put fancy on the wing,
and imagine postures they never beheld. This would be dangerous occupation.
Neither the law, nor the right of the accused parties to be informed of the
nature of the accusation against them, imposed such particularization upon
the corporation authorities." (35 La. Ann. 1010, 1011.)
19. Art. 27, La. Crim. Code of 1942. See Reporters' Comment on lying in
wait with a dangerous weapon.
20. 215 La. 40, 39 So.(2d) 817 (1949).
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sharpened to a point and welded to a flat piece of metal to hold
them upright on the pavement. Intending to place these blades
upon the highway in such a way that they would cut the tires
of the bus and cause the bus to be wrecked, the defendants went
to a prearranged place where they waited for the bus to arrive.
Before the bus arrived and before the mowing machine blades
had been set upon the highway, an alarmed neighboring farmer
began shooting and the defendants fled from the scene of their
intended crime. There was little doubt but that if the defendants
had carried out their criminal purpose they would have committed the crime of Aggravated Criminal Damage to Property, because of the foreseeability of danger to the lives of the driver and
passengers on the bus. If the blades had been set upon the highway, but the bus driver had stopped in time to avoid a disaster,
the defendants would clearly have been guilty of Attempted Aggravated Criminal Damage to Property. The principal issue
in the case arose Out of the fact that the defendants' criminal
activity had not proceeded beyond the point where they were
lying in wait for the bus with the instrumentalities for wrecking it in their possession. The theory of the conviction had been
that this constituted "lying in wait with a dangerous weapon."
Admittedly the mowing machine blades were not dangerous
weapons per se. Yet in the manner of their intended use they were
"calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm."2'
Justice Hamiter, who prepared a very careful dissenting opinion,
took the view that since the mowing machine blades had not
been fully assembled and placed upon the highway they were
never used as dangerous weapons. Actual use of the instrumentalities in such a way as to endanger human life, stated Justice
Hamiter, was necessary before they could be characterized as
"dangerous weapons."
Justice Hawthorne, in writing the majority opinion, stressed
the fact that in an Attempt to commit a crime, and especially
where the lying in wait provision is involved, only intended use
can ordinarily be established. He, therefore, concluded that, at
least for the purposes of this provision of the Attempt article, an
instrumentality "may be a dangerous weapon if the one lying in
wait intends to use it in a manner calculated or likely to produce
death or great bodily harm. '22 This question of the manner and
21. Art. 2, La. Crim. Code of 1942: "'Dangerous weapon' Includes any gas,
liquid or other substance or instrumentality, which, in the manner used, is
calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm."
22. 39 So. (2d) 817, 824.
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nature of the intended use of the instrumentality is a question of
fact for the determination of the jury in view of all the circumstances of the case. It is submitted that the court's decision in
the Murff case is the only one which could give real practical
effect, except where inherently dangerous weapons such as a
gun are employed, to the lying in wait provision of the Attempt
article. It is also consistent with the definition of a dangerous
weapon which contemplates that a very broad meaning shall
be given to that term so that no instrumentality will be rejected
as a dangerous weapon merely because of its substance or form.
The proper test to be applied in determining what shall constitute a dangerous weapon in cases like the Murff case should
be the intended use of the instrumentality. However, this rule
will probably not be carried beyond the facts of that case where
the mowing machine blades had been assembled in such a way
that they could be used as a dangerous instrumentality, and it
was only the placing of the instrumentality upon the highway
which remained to be done. If it could be said that the offenders
waited with materials which were to be assembled as a wrecking
device, then there might be strong justification for the position
that they did not as yet constitute a "dangerous weapon" within
the meaning of the lying in wait provision. As the writer views
the facts of the principal case this construction would be a little
far-fetched and technical.
It is interesting to note that, even though dissenting Justice
Hamiter was not willing to treat the offenders' act as an Attempt
to commit Aggravated Criminal Damage to Property, he suggested by way of dictum that the offenders might well have been
prosecuted for conspiracy to commit that crime. The companion
inchoate crime of Criminal Conspiracy 23 requires a combination
of two or more persons, which was easily satisfied in the principal
case; and any act, even though clearly in the preparation zone,
is sufficient to satisfy the overt act requirement of that offense.
Illegal Carrying of Weapons-Concealment of Large Knife
The crime of Illegal Carrying of Concealed Weapons, as set
out in Article 95 (1) of the Criminal Code, purported, without the
usual specification of the various types of weapons included, to
cover the same type of criminal activity which had been prohibited by the then existing statutes. 24 This was done by making the
23. See Art. 26, La. Crim. Code of 1942, Criminal Conspiracy.

24. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, §932 [:Dart's Crim. Stats. (1939) § 1274]; La. Act
112 of 1898; La. Acts 61 and 107 of 1902; La. Act 43 of 1906.
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offenses applicable to the intentional concealment on one's person "of any firearm or other instrumentality customarily used as
a dangerous weapon." As thus phrased it would cover those
instrumentalities which are dangerous weapons per se, such as
a pistol, bowie knife, blackjack and possibly a straight razor. In
State v. Davis25 the court held that "a large knife" had many
proper uses, and could not be held to constitute "an instrumentality customarily used as a dangerous weapon" within the meaning of Article 95 (2).
The widespread carrying of large knives, ice picks, and so
forth by many members of the rougher element of society, with
such implements intended as a handy means of either offense or
defense, has created a problem for law enforcement officers. It
would hardly bo appropriate to define broadly the carrying of
concealed weapons to include any instrumentality which could
be used as a dangerous weapon. If this were done many legitimate hunters and craftsmen might suddenly find themselves
outside the pale of the law. At the same time, there is much
which might be said in favor of amending and extending Clause
(1) of Article 95 to embrace the intentional concealment upon
one's person of "any firearm or other instrumentality customarily
used or intended' for use ast a dangerous weapon." (Additional
phrase indicated by italics.) While the state would have the
burden of proving the intended use beyond any reasonable doubt,
the extended scope of the statute would make it applicable in
those extreme and aggravated cases where the dangerous nature
of the activity was clear. This is, of course, a matter of policy
for the legislature to decide, rather than a matter addressed to
the discretion of the courts or of the writer.

B.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Extradition
Both Federal2 6 and Louisiana2 7 law provides for the arrest
and extradition of a fugitive from justice in another state. It is
essential to such extradition proceedings that the person arrested
must have been charged with a crime in the other state, and
the extradition papers must be accompanied by a properly certified copy of the indictment. 28 In In re Commisso 29 the relator had
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

214 La. 885, 39 So.(2d) 164 (1949).
U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 2; U.S. Rev. Stat. § 5278.
Arts. 160-167, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
Id. at Art. 160.
214 La. 1055, 39 So.(2d) 729 (1949).
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been arrested upon a requisition by the Governor of Tennessee,
which requisition had been held insufficient because the copy of
the indictment accompanying the requisition papers had not been
certified as authentic by the governor. The court instructed the
Tennessee agents to secure a correction of the requisition papers
and set a rehearing of the case. Thereupon the district attorney
nol prossed the original extradition affidavit and filed a new
affidavit, pursuant to Article 168 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 30 to detain the relator until proper extradition papers
could be furnished by the Tennessee authorities. The relator
invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of the court claiming that
he had already been held, under the original affidavit, for a
period of thirty days, and that Article 168 could not be employed
as a means of imprisoning him for a period exceeding that time.
In upholding this contention and ordering the discharge of the
relator, the supreme court made it clear that, regardless of the
filing of successive affidavits, the accused cannot be held awaiting proper formal extradition papers for a period longer than
thirty days.
Venue-Theft by Obtaining Money by False Pretenses
Proper venue for the prosecution of stealing crimes has given
the courts considerable trouble, for present day business and
banking conditions are such that the various elements of a theft
are frequently distributed over two or more different parishes.
This is particularly true in Theft by obtaining money by false
pretenses. Certain generalizations may safely be made from
the Louisiana jurisprudence. The place where the pretense was
uttered has been treated as relatively immaterial where the court
has been seeking to find the single parish where the offense had
been committed. The gist of the offense was the obtaining of the
property or money. The venue situation might be very complicated where the money was obtained by checks received in
one parish, cashed or deposited in a second parish, and honored
by the drawee bank in a third parish. 'In such a case the problem
of ascertaining where the money was obtained was a difficult
one, as evidenced by a number of very perplexing 1940 venue
31
decisions.
In an effort to solve this troublesome legal riddle, Article 13
30. This article provides an ancillary procedure whereby, on oath of a

credible person that the defendant is believed to be a fugitive from justice the
accused may be held for thirty days to await regular extradition proceedings.
31. For a discussion of these decisions, see The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1939-1940 Term (1941) 3 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 379.
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of the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended in 194232 to
provide that "where the several acts constituting a crime shall
have been committed in more than one parish, the offender may
be tried in any parish where a substantial element of the crime
has been committed." While this liberal provision should definitely minimize the venue problem in Louisiana, it does not mean
that the prosecution may be brought in every parish having some
connection with the crime. It is necessary that a "substantial
element" of the crime may be found in the parish. This requirement was applied in State v. Pollard33 where the defendant was
prosecuted in Caldwell Parish for Theft in obtaining money from
the state by fraudulent representations as to road work purported
to have been done in that parish. The project engineer's office
was in Caldwell Parish and the falsified records which were submitted as a basis for the payment received were prepared in that
parish. In reversing the judgment because of improper venue,
the supreme court stressed the facts that the check received
was issued and signed in the City of Baton Rouge and was drawn
on a Baton Rouge bank. The check was delivered to the offices
of the defendant in Bossier Parish and was deposited by the defendant in a Bossier Parish bank. According to the facts, as recited in the court's opinion, the fraudulent estimate of work done,
while prepared in Caldwell Parish, was submitted to the department of highways in East Baton Rouge Parish. Thus, not even
the fraudulent representation was completed in Caldwell Parish.
While Caldwell Parish was interested in the offense because its
roads had suffered as a result thereof, no complete substantial
element of the crime was located in that parish. Thus even the
liberal provisions of the amended Article 13 were not satisfied.
It is interesting to speculate as to venue possibilities in a situation such as the Pollard case. Had the fraudulent estimate been
submitted to a representative of the highway department in Caldwell Parish the false representation would have been completed
there and a different venue situation might well have resulted.
Although the court refuses to go beyond the actual decision of that
case, they might well have found a proper basis for venue if the
prosecution had been brought in East Baton Rouge Parish where
the false estimate was filed, the checks were issued, and finally
honored by the drawee bank. Possibly venue might also be had
in Bossier Parish where the check was received by the contractor
32. La. Act 147 of 1942.
33. 41 So. (2d) 465 (La. 1949).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW[

[VOL. X

and deposited to his account. Certainly substantial elements of
criminal liability are found in each of those parishes.
Juvenile Court-Jurisdictionof Murder by Fifteen Year Old
1948 amendments to Sections 5234 and 9635 of Article VII of
the Louisiana Constitution have extended the juvenile court's exclusive jurisdiction to include all crimes committed by children
under the age of fifteen. Prior to these amendments juvenile
offenders had been subject to criminal prosecution for capital
crimes and Attempted Aggravated Rape. In State v. Anderson"
the extended juvenile court jurisdiction was applied in favor of
a defendant under fifteen years of age who had been charged
in 1947 with a murder committed in that year. In 1949 the accused
was permitted to withdraw his plea of not guilty and to challenge
the jurisdiction of the court to try him as a criminal. In conformity with the 1948 amendment giving the juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction of criminal acts of children under fifteen,
the trial judge sustained the defendant's plea and ordered his
discharge. On appeal, the state did not question the applicability
of the 1948 amendment as a limitation on the court's criminal
jurisdiction over previously committed offenses. It was urged,
however, that the trial judge should have transferred the case
to the juvenile court, rather than to order the defendant's discharge. Act 169 of 1944 makes it the mandatory duty of the trial
judge to transfer cases where the juvenile court is vested with
exclusive jurisdiction. While this statute stated an exception
in "charges of capital crimes or charges of attempted aggravated
rape" (then triable as crimes), that exception was necessarily
nullified by the constitutional amendment which now gives the
juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction in all cases. In essence, the
purpose of the statute was to avoid the delay which would result from the subsequent filing of a separate charge of juvenile
delinquency, by providing for a mandatory and immediate transfer of the case to the juvenile court in those instances where the
criminal district court is without jurisdiction.
Jury Venires-Exclusion of Class as Discrimination
The prohibition against discrimination, set out in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, has been consistently applied in cases where there has been a systematic exclu34. Adopted pursuant to La. Act 539 of 1948.
35. Adopted pursuant to La. Act. 513 of 1948.
36. 41 So. (2d) 809 (La. 1949).
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sion of negroes from jury serviceY7 While other charges of class
discrimination have been frequently urged, they have seldom
been upheld.38 In such cases adequate proof of actual and systematic discrimination is ordinarily lacking. In State v. Poe39 a motion to quash the venire on the grounds that no members of defendant's class (World War II veterans) were on the jury list,
and that no members of the jury panel had been drawn from
defendant's ward, had been overruled. The supreme court affirmed
the trial court's ruling, merely citing Article 202 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure without discussion. The court had similarly
approved, in a 1947 decision, the trial judge's refusal to set aside
the petit jury venire on the ground that white manual laborers
40
had been sytematically excluded by the jury commission.
Long Form Indictments-Necessary Averments
The long form indictment must be used for charging those
special crimes which are not included in the Criminal Code. Such
indictments must state every fact and circumstance necessary to
constitute the offense. 41 In State v. Quinn42 the accused had been
43
convicted of the illegal possession for sale of intoxicating liquors.
The bill of information upon which defendant had been tried had
alleged defendant's possession of intoxicating liquors for purposes
of sale, but had failed to allege further that such possession for
sale was in a dry parish where the sale of intoxicating liquor had
been outlawed by a local option election. In accord with a wellsettled principle of Louisiana jurisprudence, 44 that where the
indictment is substantially defective in failing to state every essential element of the crime the nullity may be complained of
after conviction by a motion in arrest of judgment, the conviction
and sentence were set aside.
Similarly, in State v. Davis45 an information for Illegal Carrying of Weapons 46 which charged the defendant with the intentional concealment on or about his person of a "dangerous wea37. See Comment

(1948) 8 LOUISIANA LAw REvIEW

548.

38. Id. at 552.
39. 214 La. 606, 38 So.(2d) 359 (1948).
40. State v. Krieger, 212 La. 527, 33 So.(2d) 58 (1947).
41. Art. 227, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
42. 214 La. 368, 37 So.(2d) 821 (1948).
43. La. Act 15 of 1934, § 13, as amended by La. Act 17 of 1935 (1 E.S.).
44. State v. Pridgen, 187 La. 569, 572, 175 So. 63, 64 (1937), where the indictment failed to charge that the sale was "for beverage purposes"; State v.
Waits, 210 La. 769, 772, 28 So.(2d) 265 (1946), where the information failed to
charge that the sale was "in or about any tavern, house of public entertainment, or a shop for retailing liquors."
45. 214 La. 885, 39 So.(2d) 164 (1949).
46. Art. 95(1), La. Crim. Code of 1942.
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pon-to wit, a large knife," was held insufficient to sustain a
conviction. There was no allegation that the large knife in question was a bowie knife, dirk, or other special type of knife which
could be said to be "customarily used as a dangerous weapon."
As a result, the information failed to state facts establishing this
necessary element of the crime charged. The information could
not be sustained under the short form authorized by the 1942
47
amendment to Article 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
for it is sacramental to the short form method of charging a
Criminal Code crime that the name of the crime and also the
number of the article of the Criminal Code denouncing that particular offense must be stated. These requirements had not been
met in the Davis case.
In State v. Willson4" the murder indictment, apparently
drafted in conformity with some old common law indictment in
the district attorney's file, charged that the defendant "did feloniously, willfully, unlawfully and with malice aforethought did
kill and murder
" Defense counsel
had moved to quash the indictment on the ground that it was
not drawn in conformity with the short form provided in Article
235, 49 nor did it state the crime of Murder as now defined in Article 30 of the Criminal Code. 50 In affirming a conviction of Manslaughter and upholding the trial judge's ruling that the indictment was sufficient, the supreme court pointed out that the
forms outlined in Article 235 are permissive, not exclusive. Without any detailed discussion of the point, Justice McCaleb continued that "the indictment contains all the essential ingredients
of the crime of murder." Justice McCaleb's conclusion was probably based upon the idea that one could not kill and murder willfully and with malice aforethought without having the "specific
intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm" which is necessary
for Murder as defined in Article 30(1) of the Criminal Code.
However, it would be much safer to frame indictments either in
conformity with the short forms provided by Article 235 or according to the present definition of the crime as stated in the
Criminal Code. While the use of obsolete common law terminiology may be excused as surplusage or as having substantially the
same meaning as the present day elements of criminal liability,
47. La. Act 147 of 1942.
48. 41 So.(2d) 69 (La. 1949).
49. The short form for murder reads "AB murdered CD."
50. Article 30(1) defines murder as the killing of a human being "(1)
when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.
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which was apparently the supreme court's approach in the
Willson case, it results in a confusion of thinking which might
well vitiate the indictment.
Short Form Indictments
Where the short form indictment prescribed by Article 235 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure is used, great care must be
exercised to make sure that the requisites of that form have been
fully complied with. In State v. Johnson,51 an indictment, charging that defendant "attempted unlawfully to kill" the person
named, was held sufficient to sustain a conviction for Attempted
Manslaughter. It was argued in a motion in arrest of judgment
that the indictment was not in strict compliance with Article 235,
in that it should have alleged that appellant "attempted to unlawfully kill" the named victim. It will be noted that there
had been a slight technical departure from the short form for
Attempt provided in Article 235, in that the word "to" was placed
after the word "unlawfully," rather than after the word "attempted." In upholding the trial judge's overruling of the motion in
arrest of judgment, the supreme court agreed that the technical
departure did not in any way becloud the nature of the indictment and that the accused was fully advised of the nature and
cause of the charge against him. The supreme court further
pointed out that even if there was a defect it was merely a formal
defect which must be raised by demurrer or motion to quash in
5 2
advance of trial.
In State v. Wright53 the short form for Simple Burglary was
strictly adhered to and the court reiterated its holding on numerous prior occasions that indictments and informations drawn in
conformity with the short forms are sufficient to inform the accused of the nature of the charge against him and to support
54
a plea of former jeopardy.
Indictments-Name of Victim
The name of the person injured is an essential element of the
indictment in crimes against the person. 55 The name of the
51.
52.
53.
54.

214 La. 535, 38 So.(2d) 162 (1948).
Citing Art. 253, La. Code of Crim.. Proc. of 1928.
41 So.(2d) 76 (La. 1949).
For discussion of the history, development and constitutionality of the

short form indictment, see Comment (1944) 6 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW 78.

55. Art. 230, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; the name of the victim is
required even when the short form is used-see short forms for murder,
aggravated battery, aggravated rape, etc., Art. 235, La. Code of Crim Proc.
of 1928.
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owner, however, has not been considered an essential ingredient
in charges of crimes against property, such as Theft5 6 Following
this line of distinction, the court held in State v. Wilde 57 that an
indictment for Forgery need not name the party defrauded, and
that the defendant is not entitled to that information through a
bill of particulars unless he shows it to be necessary to a proper
defense of the case. 58 In actual practice such a bill of particulars
is usually granted,5 9 and the necessity for such information is
fairly easy to establish.
Bill of Particulars-WhenGranted
When the crime is charged by a short form indictment, the
provision for a bill of particulars ° should be liberally construed;
and it is reversible error to deny the accused any particulars
which would help him to understand fully the nature of the
chargeA' Where the long form indictment is used the trial court
has a wider discretion as to the granting or refusal of the bill of
particulars. 62 In State v. Poe,5 the accused had been charged
with Attempted Simple Kidnapping by a long form indictment
which specified that the offender had attempted forcibly to seize
and carry the victim away. A motion for a bill of particulars
requesting detailed information as to how the crime was alleged
to have been committed was refused. In holding that the ruling
was a proper exercise of the trial judge's discretion, the supreme
court declared that the bill "was plainly an attempt to obtain
knowledge of the evidence upon which the State relied to prove
'6
its case."

4

Bill of Particulars-ARestriction Upon the Charge
It is well settled that "a bill of particulars cannot change
the offense charged or in any way aid an indictment or informa56. State v. Miller, 170 La. 51, 127 So. 361 (1930). See also the short form
for Theft set out in Art. 235, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
57. 214 La. 453, 38 So.(2d) 72 (1948).
58. The per curiam showed that defense counsel had reserved no bill of
exceptions to the refusal of his request for a bill of particulars. 214 La. 453,
460, 38 So.(2d) 72, 75.
59. See State v. Miller, 214 La. 472, 38 So. (2d) 140 (1948), Cf. the recent
Mississippi case of Wilson v. State, 37 So.(2d) 19 (Miss. 1948), where the name
of the victim in a forgery prosecution was considered so material that a
variance in the charge and the proof was ground for reversal.
60. Art. 235, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
61. State v. Brooks, 173 La. 9, 136 So. 71 (1931).
62. Art. 288, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928. See State v. Sheffield, 201 La.
1055, 10 So.(2d) 894 (1942) and State v. Alford, 206 La. 100, 18 So.(2d) 666 (1944),
where bills of particulars were properly refused.
63. 214 La. 606, 38 So.(2d) 359 (1948).
64. 214 La. 606, 626, 38 So.(2d) 359, 365.
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tion fundamentally bad." 65 However, the supreme court has recently indicated in State v. Mesino6 6 that the converse does not
follow and that the bill of particulars may so limit the charge in
an otherwise valid indictment as to render it subject to a motion
to quash. In that case the short form indictment adequately
charged the crime of Negligent Homicide, and the bill of particulars was in proper order. In remanding the case for trial on the indictment, which had been improperly quashed by the trial judge,
the supreme court very appropriately pointed out that the bill of
particulars furnished would operate "to limit the scope of proof
on the trial by restricting the introduction of evidence to the
proof of those facts set out in the bill of particulars. 6 7 Justice
Moise, speaking for the court, then continued that "the court in
considering the motion to quash the indictment must construe
those facts as set out in the bill of particulars to be true and determine whether or not, as proved, they constitute the crime
charged." Recognizing that this statement might be subject to
some criticism in view of the supreme court's previous holdings
that the bill of particulars is not to be treated as a part of the
indictment, Justice Moise continued, "It is of no moment whether
we say that a bill of particulars is an amendment or an amplification of the indictment or a restriction of proof to be offered
by the State. It is easier to find fault with a remedy proposed
than to propose a remedy that is faultless." 6
The practical common sense of Justice Moise's dictum conclusion is easily recognizable, for it would appear a futile procedure to continue a trial under a charge which had been so limited by the bill of particulars as to render a valid conviction impossible. At the same time, it is neither wise nor logical to treat
the bill of particulars as a part of the indictment. Let us suppose
that the defendant did not file a motion to quash and went to
trial under a charge wherein proof had been restricted by an
incorrect bill of particulars. He would probably secure an acquittal by excluding evidence inconsistent with the bill of particulars. Could he then plead former jeopardy as a bar to a
subsequent prosecution for that crime? 69 A plea of former jeopardy could only be sustained if the court held the indictment
65. State v. Bienvenu, 207 La. 859, 865, 22 So.(2d) 196, 198 (1945).
66. 214 La. 744, 38 So.(2d) 622 (1949).
67. 214 La. 744, 748, 38 So.(2d) 622, 623, citing numerous general authorities.
68. Ibid.
69. See State v. Shiro, 143 La. 842, 79 So. 426 (1918), where such a plea was
sustained, despite the fact that proof of the crime was actually impossible at
the first trial, due to rulings excluding evidence.
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valid. 70 To do this would necessitate reverting to the traditional
concept of the nature of the bill of particulars, that is, that it
is not a part of the indictment but is merely a supplemental
means of protecting the right of the accused to be informed as to
the nature of the charge brought against him. In such a case
the court would be faced with the technical decision which Justice Moise so neatly sidestepped in the Mesino case dictum, and
would probably conclude that the bill of particulars is only "a
restriction of proof to be offered by the state."71
Recusation of the Trial Judge
Article 303 of the Code of Criminal Procedure specifies the
causes for recusation of the trial judge. The first, and most
litigated, of these is "his being interested in the cause." In
State v. Doucet 72 the supreme court had ordered the recusal of
a trial judge who had been the leader of a rival political faction
interested in securing defendant's conviction and preventing his
re-election to the office of sheriff. Compare, however, the case
of State v. Hutton,73 where the trial judge's statement, in sentencing defendant's nineteen year old younger brother and accomplice in the burglary, that the defendant should receive a heavier
sentence if convicted, did not constitute such an "interest" as
would require the judge to recuse himself. It appeared significant
that the judge was not acquainted with defendant and had no
personal interest in the outcome of the trial.
In the recent case of State v. LaBorde7 4 defense counsel moved to recuse the trial judge who, while previously serving as
district attorney, had prosecuted defendant on several occasions
for other crimes. The motion for recusation alleged that when the
defense stated that a jury trial was not desirable because the
accused was too well known to the jurors, the trial judge remarked "the accused would have a better chance before a jury than
before this court." In upholding the refusal of the trial judge
to recuse himself or to submit the motion to another judge for
determinationJ 5 the supreme court reaffirmed its previous hold70. Under Art. 279, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, it is necessary, in
order to constitute former jeopardy, "that the former acquittal or conviction
was rendered on a sufficient indictment."
71. 214 La. 744, 748, 38 So.(2d) 622, 623 (1949).
72. 199 La. 276, 5 So.(2d) 894 (1942). Accord: State v. Manouvrier, 199 La.
300, 5 So.(2d) 901 (1942); State v. Hayes, 199 La. 549, 6 So.(2d) 657 (1942).
73. 198 La. 174, 3 So.(2d) 549 (1941).
74. 214 La. 644, 38 So.(2d) 371 (1948).
75. Art. 309, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, requires the trial judge to
refer the application for a recusation to another judge for determination, unless the facts stated, If proved, would not constitute a legal ground for re-
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ing in State v. Phillips that mere bias or prejudice on the part of
the judge is not one of the specified grounds of recusation, and
that "interest in the cause" means that it must be "to the judge's
personal advantage, 7'1 to decide the case or to influence the decision for or against the accused. The supreme court's statement,
as it had been in the Phillips case, was in the nature of dictum in
view of its express holding that the facts alleged in the motion
for recusation did not show that the trial judge, was biased or
prejudiced, or unable to conduct a fair and impartial trial. Giving
the trial judge the benefit of a very large doubt, the supreme
court construed his statement as meaning that he would be guided by the law and the evidence and could not be swayed by sympathy and those other extraneous considerations which so often
77
influence a jury.
While the LaBorde decision probably represents a correct
limitation of the phrase "his being interested in the cause," it
would appear that "substantial bias or prejudice against the accused" should be a ground for recusation of the trial judge. The
trial judge plays such an important part in the trial procedure
and is given such a wide discretion in sentencing that the accused
should be able to demand his impartiality. If this additional
cause for recusation were added by a legislative amendment of
Article 303, it should not be interpreted to mean that the judge
in the Hutton case would be disqualified by reason of his stricter attitude toward adult offenders, or that a judge would be disqualified merely because he had previously prosecuted an accused for other crimes while serving as district attorney. Under
the theory of the LaBorde decision, the judge's utterance in that
case would not serve to disqualify him, but that case is pretty
close to the line and might be decided differently if "substantial
bias or prejudice against the accused" were a specific ground of
recusation.
Insanity as a Defense-Appointment of Lunacy Commission
In State v. Cook78 the defendant applied for the appointment
cusation. See cases cited in the LaBorde opinion, 214 La. 644, 655, 38 So.(2d)
371, 375.
76. 159 La. 903, 906, 106 So. 375, 376 (1925).
77. Justice McCaleb states that "This [remark] does not indicate that the
court, in trying the case, would not be guided by the evidence adduced or that
appellant would be convicted if the proof did not show his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. On the contrary, it strikes us that the judge was merely
expressing a fact, well known to members of the Bar, that a jury oftimes is
motivated in its deliberations by considerations of sympathy or other extraneous matters, whereas, the judge, as a trained trier of facts, will invariably be
guided by the law and the evidence." 214 La. 644, 658, 38 So.(2d) 371, 376.
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of a lunacy commission to defense council the mental condition of
the accused both at the time of the trial and at the time of the
commission of the offense. In support of the motion it was
claimed that there was hereditary insanity in the family of the
accused, but there was no specific allegation of facts indicating
actual insanity in his case. The coroner reported, after examining
and observing the accused, that there was no indication of insanity. The trial judge refused to appoint a lunacy commission
and overruled the defense counsel's motion of present insanity.
In upholding the trial judge's ruling, the supreme court reaffirmed its previous decision in State v. Bessar79 that the defendant's right to a hearing on the plea of present insanity is not
an unqualified one, and is only provided for in cases where the
trial judge has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant
is mentally incapable of understanding the proceedings and
assisting in his defense.
Since no special plea of insanity at the time of the crime was
filed, the trial judge was justified in assuming that defense attorneys had abandoned this phase of the insanity defense which
would have raised a jury question relating to guilt or innocence.
In the district judge's per curiam, which was set out in the supreme court opinion as d, means of presenting the facts of the
case, the trial judge states that if the defense of insanity at the
time of the commission of the crime had been urged at the trial,
and a request for a lunacy commission made, "the court most
assuredly would have appointed a commission in compliance
with Article 267.. . ." This gratuitous statement by the trial judge
is a little more favorable to the rights of the accused than are the
actual provisions of Article 267 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
which states that the court "may appoint" a lunacy commission
where insanity at the time of the crime becomes an issue in the
case. Usually the lunacy commission will be appointed; but
where the plea of insanity is entirely unsupported by evidence, as
it apparently was in the principal case, the court might well
refuse to appoint a lunacy commission. Such a refusal was upheld in State v. Messer"° where the trial judge refused to appoint
a lunacy commission because he was convinced that the defendant
was sane and that defense counsel had filed the insanity plea as
a dilatory tactic. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that this
79. 213 La. 299, 34 So.(2d) 785 (1948), discussed by writer in The Work of
the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1947-1948 Term (1949) 9 LOUISIANA LAW
REviEw 263.
80. 194 La. 238, 193 So. 633 (1940).
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refusal was, under the circumstances of that case, a proper exercise of judicial discretion.
Motion for Severance
The granting or refusal of defense counsel's motion for
a severance, where parties are jointly indicted for a crime, is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. His ruling will
not be reversed on appeal, except in case of manifest error and
clear injury to the accused. In State v. Cook,81 a joint trial for a
murder, the motion for a severance alleged that the defenses of
the two defendants were antagonistic, with each defendant claiming in his confession that the crime was entirely committed by the
other. If this situation had actually existed, a clear case for a
severance would have been made out, and the trial judge's refusal
to grant the motion would have been reversible error. However,
the state's case was not based on the antagonistic confessions.
In a-subsequent oral confession, one of the defendants admitted
firing the fatal shot. The state relied upon this confession and
claimed that both defendants were present, and were mutually
aiding and abetting each other in the attack upon the deceasedthus rendering both parties guilty as principals, regardless of
who fired the gun. In affirming the murder conviction, the supreme court pointed out that upon the contradictory hearing of
the motion for a severance "there was no evidence before the court
showing that the defenses were antagonistic." The court also
stressed the fact that no conflict or antagonism appeared during
the trial of the case. Actually, this latter point was in the nature
of make-weight support of the first, since the question of antagonistic defenses is determined by the facts available as of the
time the motion for severance is made and the hearing held.
Continuance
The granting or refusing of a motion for a continuance is
addressed to "the sound discretion of the trial judge," and only
an "arbitrary or unreasonable abuse of such discretion may be
reviewed-on appeal. 8' 2 In State v. Comery,83 a continuance was
sought during the middle of the trial in order to secure the attendance of two physicians as witnesses. The court recessed briefly
and, after a fruitless effort was made to reach the witnesses over
the telephone, refused to order a continuance. The trial court's
81. 215 La. 163, 39 So.(2d) 898 (1949).
82. Art. 320, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
83. 214 La. 245, 36 So.(2d) 781 (1948).
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refusal was affirmed on the ground that the defense counsel had
not exercised due diligence in securing the witness before the
trial commenced.8 4 In State v. Poe 5 the defendant had been arraigned five days after his arrest, and had been brought to trial
a month later. There was no specific showing of injury, and the
defense failed to sustain its contention that the trial judge was
guilty of "rushing the case to trial precipitately." In two other
cases where lesser periods had intervened, but where there was
no showing that the refusal of a continuance had deprived the
defendant of the presence of any specific witnesses 6 or had otherwise prejudiced his defense,8 7 the trial judge's ruling .was upheld as a proper exercise of discretion.
The trial judge is granted broad powers, under Article 253 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, to amend the indictment before
or during the trial in respect to any defect or to cure a variance
between the indictment and the proof. Where such an amendment is made the defendant is entitled to a continuance if he
has been misled or prejudiced by the defect or variance. Such
prejudice has been consistently found to exist in cases where
the date of the alleged crime was changed and the defendant
had been relying upon an alibi defense. In such instances the defendant is entitled to a continuance in order that he may prepare
to account for his presence on the date now charged, and the refusal to grant a continuance has been held to constitute reversible
error.88 Compare, however, the recent case of State v. Thomas"9
where the information, which charged Simple Burglary of the
Dillard University Hospital building at a certain address, had
been amended to allege specifically that the building burglarized
was the hospital nurses' home located behind the main hospital
building on the same plot of ground. In holding that defense
counsel's motion for a continuance had been properly overruled,
the supreme court pointed out that the amendment in question
"merely sets forth with more particularity the building burglarized" 90 and that the record was devoid of any evidence that the
84. Art. 322, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, requires that every motion for
a continuance based upon the absence of witnesses must show that counsel
exercised due diligence in securing the attendance of the witnesses.
85. 214 La. 606, 38 So.(2d) 359 (1948).
86. State v. Thomas, 214 La. 499, 38 So(2d) 49 (1948).

87. State v. LeBorde, 214 La. 644, 38 So.(2d) 371 (1948).
88. State v. Barnhart, 143 La. 596, 78 So. 975 (1918); State v. Singleton, 169
La. 191, 124 So. 824 (1929).
89. 214 La. 374, 37 So.(2d) 841 (1948).
90. The amendment, specifying the particular building which was burglarized, was necessary in order to cure a substantial defect in the information.
See State v. McDonald, 178 La. 612, 152 So. 308 (1934), holding that a burglary
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defendant had been misled or prejudiced in his defense by the
particularized description of the building.
Presence of Accused During Trial
Louisiana jurisprudence is in accord with the general common law rule that one on trial for a felony must be personally
present in court during every important stage of the trial from
arraignment to sentence. Further, the minutes of the court must
affirmatively show his presence.9 1 In State v. Augusta92 the supreme court had announced a possible departure from this rule,
by declaring that the defendant cannot raise the fact of his absence by motion for a new trial without seasonable objection and
exception duly taken, or taking some affirmative steps to see
that his absence is expressly recited in the minutes of the court.
In the 1949 case of State v. Pope9' the court, without any mention of the Augusta decision, clearly and definitely reverted to
the previously well-settled rule that the court minutes must affirmatively disclose the presence of the accused, and it is not
enough that the minutes give the general impression that the
defendant was present. While reaffirming the rule placing the
burden of proof on the state to make sure that the minutes show
the presence of the accused or facts from which his presence
may be directly inferred, 94 the supreme court refused to treat the
deficiency in the minutes as reversible error per se. Instead, they
remanded the case to the district court for the purpose of giving
the state an opportunity to prove, contradictorily with the defendant, that the accused was present, and have the minutes corrected accordingly.
indictment was fatally defective when it merely alleged the breaking and
entering of "The American Hat Company" which was not necessarily a building or structure. The information in the instant case was somewhat more explicit, in charging the burglary of "the building and structure" of the Dillard

University, but might well be considered inadequate since it failed to specify
which building had been invaded.

91. State v. Coston, 113 La. 717, 37 So. 619 (1904); State v. Thomas, 128 La.
813, 55 So. 415 (1911); State v. Layton, 180 La. 1029, 158 So. 375 (1934).
92. 199 La. 896, 7 So.(2d) 177 (1942), noted in (1942) 4 LOUISIANA LAW
REviEw 618.
93. 214 La. 1026, 39 So.(2d) 719 (1949). The minutes respecting the arraignment recited: "This day the accused was arraigned, and through his attorney,

waived the reading of the indictment, and pled not guilty, the case was then
assigned for trial Tuesday, June 8, 1948. The defendant was then served with
a copy of the Jury Venire and the counsel for the defendant was given until

Friday morning to file any motion."
94. In case of a short trial, it has been held that where the record shows
that the accused was present at the beginning of the trial, a presumption
arises that he was present during the remainder. State v. Collins, 33 La. Ann.
152 (1881); State v. Price, 37 La. Ann. 215 (1885); State v. Clement, 42 La. Ann.
583 (1890); State v. Starr, 52 La. Ann. 610, 26 So. 998 (1899).
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Opening Statement of District Attorney
Article 333 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires an
opening statement by the district attorney "explaining the nature
of the charge and the evidence by which he expects to establish
the same." In State v. Poe 5 the trial judge had ruled that the
district attorney's exposition in his opening statement of the difference between aggravated and simple kidnapping, was appropriate as "an explanation of the nature of the charge." Reaffirming the general principle that the scope and extent of the opening
statement is within the control of the trial judge, the supreme
court held that the allowance of the district attorney's explanation of the law applicable to the case was a proper exercise of the
judge's discretion.
Comments on Failure to Testify or Produce Witnesses
The district attorney has a right to argue logical inferences
from the evidence submitted or from evidence suppressed by the
defense.16 Comment, in rebuttal of defense contentions, upon
the failure of the accused to produce logical third party witnesses
97
was held permissible in two recent cases. In State v. McNeal,
a defendant, charged with horse stealing had testified that his
neighbors knew of his ownership of a horse similar to the one
he was charged with stealing. It was proper, therefore, for the
district attorney to state in his closing argument to the jury that
it was "quite significant" that none of the neighbors had been
called to testify to such ownership. Similarly, in State v. Poe,98
where defense counsel had urged the good character of the defendants, it was appropriate for the district attorney to tell the
jury, "If these parties are such fine characters as Mr. Parker
would lead you to believe, why then didn't he put somebody on
the stand to prove their character?"
A different situation is presented where the district attorney
comments upon the defendant's failure to take the stand. The
inference drawn may be a logical one, but it has the effec of
indirectly forcing the defendant to take the stand and run the
risk of self-incrimination. In this case, the remarks are deemed
so basically prejudicial that they entitle the defendant to a mistrial and cannot be cured by the judge's admonition to the jury
to disregard them. 9
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

214 La. 606, 628, 38 So.(2d) 359, 366 (1948).
Art. 382, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
214 La. 664, 38 So.(2d) 378 (1948).
214 La. 606, 638, 38 So.(2d) 359, 369 (1948).
State v. Marceau, 50 La. Ann. 1137, 24 So. 611 (1898); State v. Robinson,
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Responsive Verdicts
The practical importance of the 1948 responsive verdict statute, l °° wherein the proper responsive verdicts for the most important crimes are specifically stated, is illustrated by two 1948
decisions. In State v. Poe'01 the supreme court held, on rehearing,
that a verdict of Simple Assault was not responsive to a charge
of Attempted Simple Kidnapping. After the first hearing of the
case, the court had held that Attempted Simple Kidnapping by
forcible seizing and carrying the victim 10 2 necessarily included at
least a Simple Assault. It was reasoned that an assault is committed whenever an attempt is made to use force or violence upon the person of another. 1°3 On rehearing, the majority of the
court agreed as to the test to be applied, that is, "whether the
definition of the greater offense necessarily includes all the elements of the lesser," but differed as to its application. The majority opinion cited one example, and another might be suggested
by the case of the defendant who commits an attempt by lying
in wait while armed with a dngerous weapon, where a simple
assault is not "necessarily included" in the attempted kidnapping.
An added justification for the holding, which was not mentioned
04
in the Poe case or in the leading recent case of State v. Roberts,
is the fact that the two crimes were not generic. Attempted
Simple Kidnapping is a species of the kidnapping and false imprisonment genus, while Simple Assault belongs to the assault
and battery class of crimes. 0 5 Under the 1948 responsive verdict
statute, which strictly adhered to the generic offense requirement, simple assault is not a responsive verdict to any kidnapping or attempted kidnapping charge.
In State v. Murphy'0 6 the information had charged Aggravat112 La. 939, 36 So. 811 (1904). See Note (1948) 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 423.
For a complete discussion of this question see Comment, infra p.
100. La. Act 181 of 1948, amending Art. 386, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of
1928.
101.
102.
103.
104.

214 La. 606, 38 So.(2d) 359 (1948).
Arts. 27, 45(1), La. Crim. Code of 1942.
Id. at Arts. 33, 36.
213 La. 559, 35 So.(2d) 216 (1948), discussed by writer (1949) 9 Lou-

ISIANA LAW REVIEW 267.

105. This requirement is directly supported by the supreme court's earlier holding in State v. Guillory, 42 La. Ann. 581, 7 So. 690 (1890), where a
verdict of Assault with Intent to Murder was held not responsive to a murder

indictment because the two crimes were not of the same generic class. For
a complete analysis of the generic and included offense requirements of responsive verdicts in Louisiana, see Comment (1944) 5 LOUiSIANA LAW REVIEW

603.
106. 214 La. 600, 38 So.(2d) 254 (1948), noted in (1949) 9 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 576.
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ed Arson, and a verdict of guilty of "Simple Arson in the sum
of $150" was held not responsive. While the two offenses were
generic, all elements of Simple Arson are not necessarily included
in a charge of Aggravated Arson. In his opinion Chief Justice
O'Niell pointed out that the gravamen of aggravated arson is
foreseeable danger to human life; whereas the gravamen of the
offense of simple arson is the damaging of the property of another without his consent. An offender may commit Aggravated
Arson by burning his own property in such a way as to endanger
human life, while it is an essential element of the crime of Simple
Arson that the property belong to "another." Under the 1948
responsive verdict statute, Simple Arson is listed as a responsive
verdict to a charge of Aggravated Arson. In most instances the
new statute has reduced the number of responsive verdicts. However, because of possible close questions as to the "foreseeable
danger to human life," it was deemed expedient to provide that
a charge of Aggravated Arson should also embrace the lesser generic offense of Simple Arson. In this regard Chief Justice O'Niell
raises a very significant question when he declares, by way of
dictum:
"Whether it is necessary also, in a prosecution for aggravated
arson, under the provisions of Act No. 161 of 1948, in order to
make a verdict of guilty of simple arson responsive, that the
indictment shall state also that the property damaged by the
explosive substance, or set on fire, was the property of another person, other than the party accused, and that the
damaging or setting fire to the property was done without the
consent of the owner, is a matter which we need not decide
10 7
in this case.'
The necessity of these additional allegations is indicated by the
analogous decision in State v. Pace'08 where the defendant was
charged with robbery and convicted of larceny. Although larceny was a lesser and generic offense, it was held that a larceny
verdict was not responsive unless the indictment had alleged the
value of the property stolen. This allegation, while immaterial
to the aggravated crime of robbery, was essential to a charge
of the graded lesser offense of larceny.
Suspended Misdemeanor Sentences
The trial judge is authorized to suspend sentence in misde107. 214 La. 600, 605, 38 So.(2d) 254, 256.
108. 174 La. 295, 140 So. 482 (1932).
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meanor cases. Such suspension, unlike probation in felony cases,
is without supervision and conditioned only on "good behavior,"
which is specifically defined to mean that the offender "shall not
be convicted of any other crime."'10 9 In State v. Gordon"0 the court
interpreted the phrase "any other crime" to include conviction of
a federal offense. Stressing the policy of the probation law, that
is, to aid the rehabilitation of the penitent prisoner who abstains
from further crime, the court held that the condition of the
suspended sentence would be broken by any conviction "whether
local, federal or foreign."
The court in the Gordon case also settled a point of importance concerning the meaning of the declaration in Article 538 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure that upon conviction of another
crime the judge shall pronounce sentence upon the original judgment, "and shall cumulate the punishment of any subsequent
conviction or convictions. . . ." This plainly means, according
to Justice McCaleb, that the first sentence shall be served in addition to the punishment given for the second offense and that
"the sentences shall not, under any circumstances, run concurrently.""'
In Cox v. Brown" 2 the supreme court had held that suspension of forty days of a ninety-day sentence operated as a suspension of the entire sentence with the attempted limitation to forty
days being ineffective. Compare, however, the recent case of
State v. LaBorde n3 where the defendant was sentenced to a fine
of $200 and one year's imprisonment, the maximum penalty
for attempted Theft, but with the proviso that if he paid the
fine nine months of the jail sentence would be suspended. In
discussing other issues raised by the appeal, the supreme court
assumed the validity of the partial suspension of sentence. Apparently the cases may be distinguished by looking to which
part of the sentence was suspended. In the Cox case the first part
of the sentence was suspended, and the state's effort later to require actual service of the balance of the term was unavailing. In
the LaBorde case, however, the first three months of the sentence
were to be served, and then the entire remainder of the sentence
109. Art. 536, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, as amended and re-enacted
by La. Act 48 of 1942.
110. 214 La. 822, 38 So.(2d) 794 (1949).
111. 214 La. 822, 830, 38 So.(2d)794, 796.
112. 211 La. 235, 29 So.(2d) 776 (1947), discussed The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1946-1947 Term (1948) 8 LouIsIANA LAW REviEw 301.
113. 214 La. 644, 38 So.(2d) 371 (1949).
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was to be suspended. This method of partial suspension was tacitly approved.
Motion for New Trial
Where the trial judge overrules a motion for a new trial
based upon an alleged insufficiency of the evidence, or upon newly discovered evidence, the probability that the trial judge's decision will be reversed by the supreme court is very slight. Thus,
in State v. McNeal114 the supreme court applied the well-settled
rule that the trial judge's refusal to grant a new trial on the
ground that "the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence"
presents nothing for review. Upon such a motion the trial judge
may set aside a verdict if he feels*that the jury was wrong and
entertains a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. However, the judge's ruling involves a question of fact and the supreme court's appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases is limited
to questions of law. 11 5 An exception has been recognized in those
cases where there was a complete lack of evidence to prove an
essential element of the crime charged. 1 6 In this situation the
trial judge commits an error of law in refusing a new trial, which
error is reviewable by the supreme court on appeal. In State v.
Laborde"' the appellant sought to bring his appeal within this
exception, but the supreme court refused to consider the claim,
since the evidence presented to the trial judge had not been
transcribed or made a part of the record. It would appear very
difficult to bring a case within this exception unless the facts
were stipulated, fully summarized in a per curiam of the trial
judge, or sufficiently set out in a formal bill of exception to show
specifically the alleged complete absence of proof.
In the McNeal case the supreme court also upheld the trial
judge's refusal to grant a new trial on the ground of newly discovereld evidence. Here again the court followed a well-settled
line of jurisprudence, but the reasoning is somewhat different.
New trials on the grounds of newly discovered evidence are not
looked upon with judicial favor, since such evidence is frequently of a rather untrustworthy character. The supreme court has
consistently held that the trial judge, who has had a first-hand
114. 214 La. 664, 38 So.(2d) 378 (1948). Accord: State v. Vallery, 214 La.
495, 38 So.(2d) 148 (1948).
115. Art. 516, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII,

§ 10.

116. State v. Wooderson, 213 La. 40, 34 So.(2d) 369 (1948); State v. Giangosso, 157 La. 360, 102 So. 429 (1924).
117. 214 La. 644, 38 So. (2d) 371 (1948).
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opportunity to evaluate the credibility and probative effect of the
new evidence, is vested with a wide discretion in this matter
and his descision will not be reversed unless it is manifestly er8
roneous."1
Appeal-Insufficient Charge to Jury
The trial judge's charge to the jury, even though it has been
included in the transcript of the case, is not considered a part of
"the record." Thus, in State v. Davis,119 where no objection had
been made or bill of exceptions reserved to the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury upon the law relative to certain responsive verdicts, 120 there was no basis for a motion in arrest of judgment and subsequent appeal. Technically, the alleged error was
not a part of the record, and hence could not be taken advantage
of by a motion in arrest which goes only to those errors which are
"patent upon the face of the record,"' 2 1 nor could it serve as the
basis of an appeal. 1 22 The defense effort to perfect the basis of
an appeal by securing an order that a certified copy of the judge's
charge be filed with the supreme court was unavailing. The
trial judge's order was probably a nullity for he had lost juris23
diction in the case from the moment the appeal was lodged.'
Even the original inclusion of the judge's charge in the transcript
of the case would not entitle the defendant to a review unless he
had objected and made the court's ruling a matter of record by
duly preserving a bill of exception thereto. The practical reason
for requiring a timely and specific objection to the judge's charge
was succinctly reiterated by the court when it declared that "it is
not considered proper that the defendant should be permitted to
sit idly by while the judge is making an erroneous charge to the
118. State v. Saba, 203 La. 881, 14 So.(2d) 751
cussion of the Saba case and other cases in point,
LAW REVIEW 474. Cf. State v. Gardner, 198 La.
where the newly discovered evidence was on a

(1943). For a complete dissee Note (1948) 5 LOUISIANA
861, 5 So.(2d) 132 (1941),
point upon which the evi-

dence adduced at the trial had been very unsatisfactory.
119. 214 La. 831, 39 So.(2d) 76 (1949).

120. The trial was for Murder and the trial judge had failed to instruct
the jury concerning Attempted Murder, Attempted Manslaughter and Attempted Negligent Homicide. Since the case was tried before the effective
date of the new responsive verdict statute, instructions should have been
given concerning Attempted Murder and Attempted Manslaughter. State v.
Brown, 214 La. 18, 36 So.(2d) 624 (1948), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1947-1948 Term (1949) 9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
268; but there was no basis for charging Attempted Negligent Homicide, since
one cannot attempt (requiring specific intent) to commit a crime where liability is predicated solely on negligence.
121. Art. 517, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.

122. Id. at Arts. 391, 560.
123. Id. at Art. 545.
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jury, take his chances upon the verdict, and, if against him,
then by assignment of error or motion in arrest take advantage
12 4
of it."
Appeal from Municipal Court Judgments
The Louisiana Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over
municipal court judgments is specifically limited to those cases
where a fine exceeding $300, or imprisonment exceeding six
months is actually imposed, or where the constitutionality or
legality of the penalty is attacked. 125 In State v. LaBorde126 the
defendant, convicted of petty theft, had been sentenced to pay a
fine of $200 and to serve one year in jail with nine months of the
jail sentence being suspended upon the payment of the fine. In
assuming appellate jurisdiction to review the sentence the supreme court held that a sentence of one year had actually been
imposed. The suspension of nine months of that sentence upon
payment of the fine would result in a conditional release of the
defendant from imprisonment. If, however, the offender was convicted of another crime during the period of such suspension he
would be subject to arrest and must serve the full time of his
sentence in jail. 127 Justice McCaleb's majority opinion is consistent with the real nature and purpose of the suspended sentence. A sentence of imprisonment was actually imposed, but
suspended on condition that the offender should abstain from
further violations of the criminal law. The LaBorde case is different from the situation where imprisonment is imposed in
default of the payment of a fine. In that instance payment of the
fine completely relieves the offender from imprisonment and it
has been consistently held that the imprisonment sentence is not,
therefore, actually imposed within the meaning of the consti28
tution.1
VII. LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Albert H. Cotton*
ORGANIZATION AND BOUNDARIES

Perhaps the most important case decided by the Louisiana
Supreme Court during the year in the field of local government
124. 214 La. 831, 853, 39 So.(2d) 76, 83, quoting from State v. Stracner, 190

La. 457, 182 So. 571, 576.
125. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 10.
126. 214 La. 644, 38 So.(2d) 371 (1948).
127. Art. 536, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.

128. State v. Desimone, 143 La. 505, 78 So. 751 (1918); State v. Roy, 152 La.
933, 94 So. 703 (1922).
*Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

